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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH -
THE GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY OF CHAOS
The devil himself . . . knoweth not the mind of man; and even
if he did, the devil's advocate might experience considerable
difficulty in proving it to a court of law.
- Mr. Justice Frankfurter'
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has long recognized that taxpayers with large amounts of
money and property avoid the operation of the estate tax laws and higher.
tax rates by making inter vivos gifts in contemplation of death. Yet, from
the inception of the federal estate tax in 1916, statutory provisions including
the value of such transfers as part of a decedent's gross estate have proven
to be a constant source of litigation and resulting frustration to the federal
government. The notable lack of success which the government has had
in this area is abundant proof that an alternative to the present law is
necessary. Without the enactment of such an alternative, application of the
estate tax to gifts which, in effect, amount to testamentary dispositions made
during the taxpayer's lifetime will never been accomplished.2
It is the purpose of this article to trace the development of federal estate
tax law from its inception in 1916 to the present, with a view toward
demonstrating the confusion and inequity which presently characterizes the
area. Evidentiary considerations and the motives of the transferor to which
the courts have given special attention shall also be examined in some detail.
Finally, some of the more prominent alternatives suggested by authorities
in this field will be considered.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: 1916 - 1966
The Revenue Act of 19163 established a rebuttable presumption that
transfers of a material part of the decedent's property made within two years
of his death were in contemplation of death and includible in his gross estate.
In the ten year period during which this Act was in effect, the government
was successful in approximately 20 percent of the litigation involving a
total of less than $5,000,000 but lost the vast majority of the cases which
involved gifts in excess of $120,000,000. In 1926, Congress, recognizing
the inadequacies of the 1916 Act, enacted section 302(c) of the Revenue
1. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICs 55 (1939).
2. See Pavenstedt, The Limitation of Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation
of Death by the Revenue Act of 1950, 49 Micis. L. Rev. 839, 841-47 (1951), for a
statistical listing of the government's unsuccessful litigation in this area which prompted
the 1950 change and which is currently in effect.
3. INT. REv. AcT, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777-78 (1916).
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Act 4 which created a conclusive presumption that gifts made within two
years of death were to be deemed made in contemplation of death. An
indication of how long this section was to survive came only three days
after the passage of the Act when the Supreme Court held a Wisconsin
statute which contained a similar six year irrebuttable presumption invalid
under the fourteenth amendment.5 In Heiner v. Donnan,6 the Court held
the federal provision unconstitutional because its enforcement resulted in
taxing some inter vivos transfers under the estate tax while exempting
others of a similar nature - the distinction between them being based solely
upon the date of the transferor's death. Such a presumption was held to be
an unreasonable classification and thus violative of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.
As a result of the Donnan decision, Congress in 1932 reverted to the
rebuttable two year presumption affecting all transfers of a "material part"
of the transferor's property.7 Once again the government found itself losing
far more cases than it was able to win. In order to eliminate much of this
fruitless litigation, section 501 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1950 (now section
2035(b)) was enacted, providing that gifts made more than three years
prior to the donor's death were to be conclusively presumed as not being
in contemplation of death. At the same time, the period of the rebuttable
presumption was extended from two to three years.8 Existing case law
was not basically changed by the 1950 amendment although it's applica-
bility, was limited to those transfers which are followed by the transferor's
death within the three year period.
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS; THE Wells CASE AND
THE TREASURY REGULATIONS
A. United States v. Wells9
The ultimate test of whether a transfer has been made in contempla-
tion of death is not the form of the transfer as determined by an objective
standard, but rather the subjective state of mind of the transferor at the
time of the transfer. This subjective test requires a court, in effect, to read
the mind of a dead man. As the late Randolph E. Paul noted: "too much
should not be expected of the courts, for they are presented in most cases
with carefully assembled evidence in proof of motive, which is a highly
elusive, subjective test of taxability."' 0
. 4. INT. Rrv. AcT, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70 (1926). The passage of this Act
was concurrent with the repeal of the federal gift tax and was viewed as the only
means by which avoidance of gift taxes could be prevented.
5. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1925).
6. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1931). The vitality of this case shall be
considered in a subsequent section.
7. INT. REv. ACT, ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 169, 279 (1932).
8. INT. REV. AcT oF 1950, § 501(a); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b).
9. 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
10. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 279 (1942).
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In United States v. Wells,1 ' the Supreme Court attempted to define
the scope of the phrase "in contemplation of death." The Court found that
the dominant purpose of the tax on transfers in contemplation of death was
to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions, and therefore, to prevent
evasion of the estate tax.12 The lower court's determination that "con-
templation of death" required a present apprehension of death from some
condition or peril which exists at the time of the transfer and which is the
direct cause of such transfer' was rejected. The Court specifically held that
transfers in contemplation of death are not limited to gifts causa mortis, but
that the statutory language embraced gifts inter vivos even though they
are fully executed and are irrevocable and indefeasible.13
Turning to the meaning of "in contemplation of death," the Court
noted that the necessary motive is not lacking merely because the transferor
is not conscious of the fact that death is imminent. While the statute refers
to contemplation of death, it does not necessarily require the contemplation
of imminent death ;14 the general expectation of death which all men enter-
tain is insufficient to meet the statutory language.', A particular concern
about death which gives rise to a definite motive which is the dominant or
impelling reason for the transfer, is necessary - a motive which falls some-
where between the apprehension of imminent death and the general ex-
pectation of death which all men entertain. Considering the vague and
abstract nature of this distinction, it is not difficult to appreciate the prob-
lems which most courts have had in attempting to determine the motive
of the transferor.
B. The Treasury Regulations
Following the Wells decision, the Internal Revenue Service sought to
clarify the language of the Supreme Court. Although the present Treasury
Regulations purport to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statutory language, a question arises with regard to whether certain changes
have been made. The Regulations provide in part that:
A transfer in contemplation of death is a disposition of property
prompted by the thought of death (although it need not be solely so
prompted). A transfer is prompted by the thought of death if (1) made
with the purpose of avoiding death taxes, (2) made as a substitute for
11. 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
12. Id. at 116. However, Professor Lowndes has challenged the validity of such
a finding. He finds that the purpose of the statute is to tax intestate as well as testate
succession and that Congress was really aiming to reach transfers by one who shortly
before his anticipated death disposed of his property so as to defeat the tax on either
testate or intestate succession. Under this view, it would be a conscious realization
of nearing death, not a testamentary intent, which would differentiate a transfer in
contemplation of death from other inter vivos transfers. Lowndes and Rutledge, AnObjective Test of Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 24 TzXAs L. Rzv. 134, 146(1946).
13. 283 U.S. 102, 116 (1931).
14. Id. at 117.
15. 283 U.S. 102, 115 (1931).
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a testamentary disposition of the property, or (3) made for any other
motive associated with death. 16
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Wells, the thought of death must
be the "dominant" or "controlling" motive for the transfer in order to fall
within the statutory language. However, it would appear that, under the
above Regulations, a transfer is in contemplation of death if it is prompted
by any motive associated with death, even though it may be more strongly
prompted by other motives which are clearly associated with life. A further
difference is the provision that a transfer made to avoid estate taxes is a
transfer in contemplation of death - a consideration which was not dis-
cussed in Wells. Such overt differences between the landmark decision in
the area and the Treasury Regulations which purport to implement this
decision give little illumination to the courts struggling in the darkness of
confusion and uncertainty.
C. The Court's Struggle
It should be quite clear at this point that the motive of the decedent
is crucial with regard to transfers in contemplation of death. The courts
must seek to unfold the transferor's subjective state of mind by directing
their inquiry to the plethora of circumstantial factors attending the transfer.
It must be recognized that in attempting to ascertain whether a particular
transfer was made with a "life" or a "death" motive, the answer, even after
a full examination of the facts, may continue to remain obscure. All too
often it lies in a gray area where there may be distinctions without differ-
ences and where the final decision seems about as sensible as if it had been
determined by a flip of the coin or by the drawing of straws between the
government's attorney and the attorney for the estate. Nevertheless, the
courts must examine the relevant facts of each case and make a determina-
tion as to what probative value such evidence should be given. In this
respect it is helpful to consider how the courts have generally handled such
cases and to categorize this litigation by its distinguishing features.
Basically, there are two distinct classes to which the courts have
directed their attention. First, there are the objective or evidentiary factors
which concern the transfer itself, for example, the amount of the transfer,
the age of the transferor. Secondly, there are the factors which aid the
courts in defining the dominant motive of the transferor at the time of
the transfer. In most cases, the courts must necessarily infer the transferor's
state of mind from the objective facts presented in evidence. While every
possible objective fact used in such cases cannot be listed, there are certain
basic facts to which the courts usually turn in reaching a decision.
1. Age and Health of the Decedent. - In certain instances, these two
factors alone may be sufficient to defeat the transfer, especially where no
16. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c) (1949).
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impelling life motive can be established.17 The health or physical condition
of the decedent is usually given greater weight by the courts. While the
element of old age may be overcome by evidence of the decedent's. mental
outlook, physical activities and business interests, serious illness is a more
difficult obstacle to overcome. It is not unusual to introduce evidence of the
transferor's ability to jump into the air and click his heels despite the fact
that he is in his middle eighties.' 8 Even more significant is the transferor's
awareness of his true physical condition at the time of the transfer. If he
knew that he was suffering from a serious or fatal disease, then it is clear
that the transfer was in contemplation of death. However, if he was not
aware of his true condition, a closer question arises as to the importance
of this factor.' 9
2. Size of transfer. - The present law eliminates the previous re-
quirement that a transfer involve a "material portion" of the transferor's
estate. It therefore would appear, that the size of the transfer should have
little relevance with regard to whether it was made in contemplation of death.
Moreover, one writer has suggested that if there is such a relationship, it
is in inverse proportion to the size of the gift, inasmuch as the govern-
ment's success in such cases diminishes as the size of the transfer increases. 20
Perhaps this is due to the fact that the larger estates can afford attorneys
who are skillful in assembling the relevant evidence.
3. Closeness of date of transfer to date of death. - While this factor
merits consideration, its evidentiary value may be easily surmounted by
other more persuasive factors. One might expect the government to be
more successful where death follows shortly after the transfer, but the
results have been far from conclusive. 21
4. Nature of the property transferred. - Where the property trans-
ferred will not produce income until after the transferor's death, a strong
argument arises that the transfer is in the nature of a testamentary disposi-
tion. This is particularly true where the subject of the transfer is life insur-
ance policies on the transferor's life.22 However, where compelling life
motives can be attributed to the transfer of insurance policies, it has been
held that the transfer was not in contemplation of death. 23
17. Bassett v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1948) ;Koch v. Commissioner,
146 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Flack v. Holtegel, 93 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1937).
18. Oliver Johnson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 680 (1948).
19. Blakeslee v. Smith, 110 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Turner v.. Hassett, 37 F.
Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1941). In both cases the transferors had cancer but were unaware
of this. In the former case, where the transferor was 73, it was held not to be in con-
templation of death; while in the latter case where he was only 50 years old, it was
so held.
20. Atlas, Contemplation of Death: What It Is and How to Avoid It, ESTATE
TAx HANDBOOK 69, 75 (1951).
21. Compare Edith H. Sharp, 30 B.T.A. 532 (1934); 33 B.T.A. 290 (1935),
where the government lost even though donor died one day after transfer, with Henry
M. Springer, 45 B.T.A. 561 (1941), where the government won even though the donor
was 75 and lived for 12 years after the transfer.
22. Garrett v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950) ; First Trust & Deposit
Co. v. Shaughnessy, 134 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 744 (1943).
23. Cronin v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947); Verne C. Hunt, 14
T.C. 1182 (1950).
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5. Life or Death Motives. - It is clear from the language of the
Wells case that there must be a testamentary intent for a transfer to be in
contemplation of death. The transfer must not be motivated, therefore, by
some objective which the transferor wishes to achieve after his death. In
this respect, the courts, in struggling to ascertain the existence or non-
existence of the requisite testamentary intent, must necessarily determine
whether the transfer was prompted by motives associated with life or
with death.
Transfers to provide security for one's family in the face of business
-uncertainties or anticipated liabilities have generally been recognized as
acceptable.2 4 This is particularly true where the decedent may have wished
his dependents to exercise the responsibility of managing the property
during his lifetime.2 5 Moreover, the recognition of a "moral obligation" to
dependents may by itself, be a sufficient "life" motive, especially where the
dependents have suffered financial setbacks or are otherwise in need of
financial aid. 26 Other transfers - to promote family harmony, 27 to avoid
income taxes 28 and to relieve the transferor of the responsibility of manag-
ing his property,29 as well as those made as part of an established gift
making policy,80 have been determined not to be in contemplation of death.
As noted above, the desire to avoid or reduce income taxes is regarded
by the courts as a motive associated with life. But it has been held, and the
Regulations provide, that a transfer made to avoid estate taxes is a motive
associated with death.81 This conclusion is based on the premise that the
avoidance of estate taxes is so related to the distribution of the transferor's
property after his death that it can only be a motive associated with death.
However, the problem is not as clear-cut as the Treasury Regulations would
make it appear. The Supreme Court has recognized that the decedent's
awareness of estate tax savings will not be sufficient if living motives were
the dominant factor in the gift. 2 Moreover, the cases which appear to
24. Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935) ; Colorado Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 305 U.S. 23 (1938) ; O'Neal v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 217 (5th
Cir. 1948).
25. Herbert G. Lowe, 38 B.T.A. 117 (1938). Cf. Henry M. Springer, 45 B.T.A.
561 (1941).
26. Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630 (1946) ; Cooney v. United States,
218 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1963) ; Lillie G. Hutchinson, 20 T.C. 749 (1953).
27. Gillette v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Terhune v. Welch,
39 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1941).
28. Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935) ; Lockwood v. United
States, 181 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
29. Welch v. Hassett, 90 F.2d 833 (1st Cir. 1937), aff'd, 303 U.S. 303 (1938)
Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 74 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1935).
30. Percy B. Eckhart, 33 B.T.A. 426 (1937), appeal dismissed, 91 F.2d 1010 (7th
Cir. 1935).
31. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 648 (1939); Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c) (1949).
32. Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630 (1946). But if the dominant
motive is to avoid estate taxes then the transfer will be in contemplation of death.
Edwin W. Rickenberg, 11 T.C. 1 (1948), aff'd on this issue, 177 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950).
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follow the Regulations on this point have used testamentary intent as the
sole criterion of whether the transfer was made in contemplation of death,
while disregarding the transferor's age, his health and his consciousness of
imminent death. A court taking this position would have difficulty in
finding a transfer not to be in contemplation of death, when made by a
wealthy and robust athlete of thirty who makes the transfer for the sole
purpose of avoiding estate taxes in the future. Such a result would pervert
the underlying reasons for taxing transfers in contemplation of death and,
in addition, would be contrary to the congressional policy of leaving to the
taxpayer the option of disposing of his property during his lifetime and
paying a gift tax, or having the property distributed after his death and
incurring an estate tax.
Another inquiry which courts must undertake is with regard to whether
a transfer was intended as a substitute for a testamentary disposition. An
important objective fact which tends to establish the transferor's testa-
mentary intent is the making of the gift at the same time that a will is
executed, particularly where the two transactions show an integrated plan
for the disposition of the taxpayer's property. 33 Where a will is made subse-
quent to the transfer of property, there may still be evidence of a general
testamentary scheme.34 However, it has been held that no inference may be
drawn from a will subsequently made, and that a testamentary intent may
not be predicated upon a correlation with prior gifts which were them-
selves primarily non-testamentary.3 5 In any event, where the dominant
motive for the transfer is one associated with life, the simultaneous execu-
tion of a will would have little evidentiary value.3 6
IV. THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
In an area where such confusion and chaos reign, it may be some con-
solation to know that there is unanimity on at least one point - a change
in the present standard is necessary. Several proposals have been made
over the years, each of which merits consideration in order to determine
which, if any, offers a more satisfactory standard.
The American Law Institute in its model estate tax statute has pro-
posed that the present statutory scheme of a three year rebuttable pre-
sumption be extended to a period of five years. In the alternative, it sug-
gests that all transfers within three years of death be subjected to the estate
33. O'Neal v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1948); Diamond v. Com-
missioner, 159 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1947); Purvin v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 929 (7th
Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 626 (1938) ; Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704(5th Cir. 1935).
34. Davidson v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1946).
35. Garrett v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950).
36. United States Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 476 (Ct.
Cl. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 633; James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
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tax.37 The former suggestion is of little aid in reducing uncertainty inas-
much as it retains the subjective standard and the other elements which
the courts are presently bound to examine. In reality, its only value will
be to make more estates subject to the charge that the transfer was made in
contemplation of death. Assuming the government's percentage of success
remains at its current low level, the extension may provide some additional
revenue but the same problems will remain. The Institute's second proposal
of creating a three year period within which all transfers will be deemed to
be in contemplation of death warrants greater consideration.
Although this proposal is based on a conclusive presumption similar to
that held unconstitutional in Donnan,38 it is doubtful that it would meet
the same fate, if enacted, since in the Bullard39 case, decided subsequent
to Donnan, the Supreme Court held it constitutional to tax a strictly inter
vivos transfer under the estate tax where this was a reasonable means of
preventing avoidance of the tax. While this alternative eliminates the
uncertainty of the subjective standard and the threat of "carefully assembled
evidence," it fails to take into consideration the circumstances surrounding
the transferor's death, his age, health or motives at the time of the transfer.
This inflexibility may prevent its enactment into law.
The late Randolph E. Paul suggested in his treatise 40 that a statute
be enacted which would provide for a conclusive two year presumption if
several conditions were found to be present. Such a presumption would
operate where the transferor had reached a specified minimum age and had
made a transfer of a substantial part of his property to heirs or natural
objects of his bounty. The merits of this proposal are obvious. It would
provide the government with an effective and certain tool to implement the
underlying congressional policy and at the same time prevent such arbitrary
results as would arise under a purely conclusive presumption. There might
be serious difficulties, however, in agreeing upon a minimum age requirement
and what would constitute a "substantial" part of the transferor's property.
Another alternative worthy of consideration is the application of an
objective test to the transferor's motives.4 1 A transfer would be deemed
to be made in contemplation of death if a reasonable man in the transferor's
position would have realized that he had no substantial life expectancy at
the time of the transfer. This test, while clearly lacking the certainty of the
proposals for a conclusive presumption, is in many respects a more desirable
alternative to the present subjective test since it would eliminate the danger
of "carefully assembled evidence." This objective test, however, would not
37. A.B.A.-A.L.I. MODEL FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX STATUTE
(Tent. Draft No. 9) (1954).
38. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
39. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938) ; Helvering v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
40. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 6.26 (1942).
41. Lowndes and Rutledge, An Objective Test of Transfers in Contemplation of
Death, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 134 (1946).
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result in any greater certainty than the subjective standard since it would
involve a determination of what constitutes a "substantial life expectancy."
It has been suggested that the objective test may be made more definite by
use of the concept of constructive notice. Since there is an obvious relation-
ship between one's age and his life expectancy, it is possible to determine
the age at which a reasonable man would realize that he has no substantial
life expectancy. This arbitrary age would function as a rule of inclusion
rather than exclusion and would not protect transferors who have not
reached the stated age and have a less than average life expectancy due
to poor health.42
Reference to the English method of handling inter vivos gifts provides
a final alternative. In England, any disposition which is not made bona fide
and complete five years prior to the donor's death is deemed to pass on his
death, and is therefore included as part of his taxable estate.43 However,
the amount of the property included in the taxable estate is prorated
according to the length of time the donor survives the date of the gift. Thus,
if he survives for less than two years, 100% is included; if he lives for two
years but less than three, 80%; three but less than four, 70%; four, but
less than five, 40%. 44 While a day-by-day or month-by-month proration
may be more effective, the basic concept of such an approach should be given
serious consideration in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Until there is a complete integration of gift and estate taxes under a
single transfer tax, the courts will, under the current law, continue to
flounder in confusion upon the shoals of statutory and judicial ambiguity.
Some of the proposed alternatives discussed above have merit and are
worthy of more serious study; it is submitted that all of them are at the
very least an improvement over the present state of the law.
Thomas J. Tomalis
42. Id. at 149-50.
43. FINANcA ACT, 1894, § 2(1) (c), 57 & 58 Vict., c. 30; CUSTOMS AND INLAND
REVENUE ACT, 1881, § 38(2) (a), 44 & 45 Vict., c. 12; FiNANce Ac'r, 1910, § 59(1),
10 Edw. 7 & 1, Geo. 5, c. 35.
44. FINANCE ACT, 1960, 64, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 44.
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EMPLOYER'S AND EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS IN PATENTS
ARISING FROM THE EMPLOYMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act of 1952 prohibits the issuance of a patent if any
applicant "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented."'
Under this statute, only the discovering employee can obtain a patent for
an invention which he has discovered during the course of his employment.
The employee-inventor's rights have long been limited, however, by the
doctrine that "where one is employed to make an invention and succeeds
in accomplishing that task during the term of his service, the invention is
the property of the employer, and the employee is bound to assign any patent
which he may obtain to his employer."'2 Where the doctrine is applicable,
the remedy of specific performance is available to compel an assignment
should an employer be faced with an unwilling employee.3
Balancing between the two extremes of complete ownership by the
employee and complete ownership by the employer, the courts have de-
veloped case-doctrine intended to provide substantial justice and to effectuate
the intention of the parties. By dividing the legal situations into three main
classifications - where a contract specifically provides for the employer's
patent rights in an invention; where there is an express or implied contract
to invent; and where there is only a general employment contract - a
workable body of law may be obtained from the confusing myriad of cases.4
II. AN EXISTING CONTRACT SPECIFICALLY REGULATES THE
PATENT RIGHTS IN ANY FUTURE INVENTIONS
As in any area of potential conflict, possible conflicts in patent claims
can best be avoided by an agreement among the parties which specifies their
respective rights. As a Michigan court stated in deciding that a compli-
cated factual circumstance did not give rise to an implied contract to assign
1. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1954). A limited exception is stated in 35 U.S.C.
§ 118 (1954):
Whenever an inventor refuses to execute an application for patent, or cannot
be found or reached after diligent effort, a person to whom the inventor has
assigned or agreed in writing to assign the invention or who otherwise shows
sufficient proprietary interest in the matter justifying such action, may make
application for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor on proof of the
pertinent facts and a showing that such action is necessary to preserve the rights
of the parties or to prevent irreparable damage....
The applicant must also make an oath that he believes himself to be the "original
and first inventor." 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1954).
2. 1 WALKER, PATENTS § 407 (Deller 2d ed. 1964).
3. Since Mississippi Glass Co. v. Franzen, 143 Fed. 501 (3d Cir. 1906), patent
assignment contracts have been held subject to the remedy of specific performance.
Accord, Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 397 (1958). For an excellent article,
see Bishop, Employers, Employees, and Inventions, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 38 (1957).
See also Cornfeld, The Employer-Employee Relation in Patent Law, 32 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'v 345 (1950).
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to the employer: "the case illustrates the advisability of reducing contractual
relations to writing where the parties contemplate that any invention made
by an employee during the course of his work shall belong to the employer." 5
Recognizing this principle, companies which employ personnel likely to
discover patentable inventions procure from such employees at the time
of hiring, an assignment of any future patents which may be obtained by
the worker. The standard clause refers to inventions "during the term of
said employment related to the employer's business."6
Inasmuch as the desirability of such an arrangement presupposes the
existence of an enforceable contract, it presents as much a question of
contract law as of patent law. Thus it is necessary that the requirements of
a valid contract - such as adequacy of consideration7 - be met. Neither
can the contract be unconscionable ;8 it must contain the necessary mutuality
of remedy for specific performance,9 and its enforcement may be barred
by the defense of laches.' 0
The requirement of an adequate consideration in the patent assign-
ment contract between an employee and employer has usually been met.
Generally, mere hiring or continued employment has been determined to
be sufficient."
Furthermore, the standard patent assignment contract has not been
found to be inherently unconscionable, 12 even in view of the fact that the
company is usually in a much stronger bargaining position than the em-
ployee. This is true even though no royalties are given to the inventor
under the contract and the invention is not used.'3 However, if the agree-
ment is not limited in time to the duration of employment or in subject
matter to the business of the employer, unconscionability will result.1 4 It
5. Gear Grinding Mach. Co. v. Stuber, 282 Mich. 455, 276 N.W. 514, 516 (1937).
For a treatment of these express contracts see ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS ch. 13
(3d ed. 1955).
6. E.g., Rotary Lift Co. v. Clayton, 127 F. Supp. 176 (D. Mass. 1954). While
an assignment contract is usual, the same legal rules would apply to a license agree-
ment. See Woodruff v. New State Ice Co., 197 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Bowers v.
Woodman, 59 F.2d 797 (D. Mass. 1932).
7. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933) ; Corthell v.
Summit Tred Co., 132 Me. 94, 167 Atl. 79 (1933) (adequate consideration not found).
8. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935). See 19 MINN. L. Rgv. 485 (1935).
9. Triumph Elec. Co. v. Thullen, 228 Fed. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1916), aff'd on other
grounds, 235 Fed. 74 (3d Cir. 1916).
10. Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1943); Reese
Folding Mach. Co. v. Fenwiels, 140 Fed. 287 (1st Cir. 1905).
11. Patent and Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Hebbord
v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co., 161 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1947).
12. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927) ; DuPont
Rayon Co. v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1933), aff'd, 71 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1934) ;
Briggs v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 92 N.J. Eq. 277, 114 Ati. 538 (1920), cert. denied,
254 U.S. 653 (1920).
13. Briggs v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra note 12.
14. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935) ; Pressed Steel Co. v. Hansen, 137 Fed. 403 (3d Cir. 1905)
(dicta). It should be noted that some cases speak of these contracts as being an
unreasonable restraint of trade and thus contrary to our antitrust public policy, as
well as being unconscionable. See, e.g., Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. H. B. Chalmers Co.,
243 Fed. 606 (2d Cir. 1917).
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is possible for a court to avoid the effects of the application of this general
rule by construing the assignment - employment contract as divisible,
separating the employment term from subsequent time periods, and holding
the contract valid only as to inventions discovered during the period
of employment. 15
In most instances, the required assignment of unlimited subject matter
patent rights for a limitless period of time will be held unconscionable
in toto, while a required assignment for the period of employment will,
if otherwise valid, be upheld. The crucial time limit separating validity from
non-validity in cases falling between these two extremes is the somewhat
nebulous "reasonable time after the termination of employment." The
determination of a "reasonable time" is a factual question which will turn
on the employee's type of work, the technique or art's status in the industry,
and other relevant circumstances, as well as the extent of the time period
itself. A one year extension of the requirement after employment has
ended has been held valid, a6 while a ten year period has been found to
be unconscionable. 17
As previously noted, the law finds unconscionability in the assignment
of unlimited subject matter for a limitless period. The cut-off point for
unconscionability relative to the assignment of subject matter, assuming an
unlimited time clause, is also found in a reasonableness concept. There
may be enforcement of a contract to assign inventions made after employ-
ment where the inventions are in a reasonably limited field,' 8 or in a specific
limited line,19 or where the assignment is reasonably restricted, if such
coverage is necessary for the protection of the employer's business.2 0 A
contract requiring a machine designer employed by a winding machine
manufacturer to assign patent rights related to clutch designs, even though
discovered after the termination of employment, has been held valid where
the new designs were particularly pertinent to winding machines; a require-
ment to assign patents to inventions in the entire field of clutch design,
however, would be invalid1.2
The equitable remedy of specific performance demands that the con-
tract possess mutuality of remedy. Thus, where the employment contract
is for an indefinite time, specific performance of an assignment clause in
the contract cannot be obtained, inasmuch as the assignor-employee could
not obtain specific performance to force continued employment for a specific
period of time.22
15. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 14.
16. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
17. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. La Chapelle, 212 Mass. 467, 99 N.E. 289 (1912).
18. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
19. Dry Ice Corp. of America v. Josephson, 43 F.2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1930).
20. Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. H. B. Chalmers Co., 243 Fed. 606 (2d Cir. 1917)
Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 Fed. 864 (4th Cir. 1895).
21. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
22. Triumph Elec. Co. v. Thullen, 228 Fed. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1916), aff'd on other
grounds, 235 Fed. 74 (3d Cir. 1916).
COMMENTS
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1966], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss4/12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Laches, another equitable concept, may also bar the plaintiff-assignee
where he unreasonably delays in bringing his action for enforcement, or leads
the employee to believe that he is not interested in the particular invention.23
If the general contract requirements have been met, the patent assign-
ment clause in the employment contract will be upheld. In practice, as with
the enforcement of any contract, as much depends upon the courts attitude
of interpreting each type of contract as upon the theoretical legality of the
agreement. As the basis of patent law is to provide an incentive to inven-
tors, judges generally are reluctant to imply an agreement to assign,2 4
although once an agreement is found, the provisions are broadly applied.25
Thus patents obtained on inventions conceived during but patented after
employment,2 6 patents obtained during employment but prior to the execu-
tion of the assignment contract,2 7 and patents obtained which relate to the
employer's business but which are the result of private invention on the
employee's own time,28 have all been held subject to assignment to the
employer. Inventions discovered by the employee prior or subsequent to
his employment, however, have generally not been considered to be within
the assignment requirements unless the employment agreement has so
provided.2 9 In addition, the employer-plaintiff has the burden of proving
that the employee's invention is within the scope of his "business" as it is
defined in the contract. 80
III. THE EMPLOYEE Is HIRED TO INVENT
Absent an express contract granting the employer an interest in any
invention made by his employee, the general rule is to award the invention
to the employee in toto.31 However, this practice is subject to an exception
which is based upon an implied contract to grant the employer an interest
23. Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1943); Reece
Folding Mach. Co. v. Fenwick, 140 Fed. 287 (1st Cir. 1905).
24. United States Colloid Mill Corp. v. Myers, 6 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
25. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
26. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Fullman v.
Steel City Elec. Co., 2 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1924).
27. United Aircraft Products, Inc. v. Warrick, 79 Ohio App. 165, 72 N.E.2d 669(1945) ; United Aircraft Products, Inc. v. Cruzan, 76 Ohio App. 540, 62 N.E.2d
763 (1945).
28. United States v. Houghton, 20 F.2d 434 (D. Md. 1927), aff'd, 23 F.2d 386(4th Cir. 1928) ; Detroit Lubricator Co. v. Lavigne Mfg. Co., 151 Mich. 650, 115
N.W. 988 (1908). Also, the ownership of the employer's business may change from
time to time. The employee is still bound to assign to the new owner. Guth v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S.
711 (1935). Intracompany transfers have no effect on the agreement. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Miller, 14 F.2d 776 (S.D. Cal. 1926).
29. Standard Plunger Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1914). And
where there is such a specific provision, it is strictly construed. Gas Tool Patents
Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1943).
30. Triumph Elec. Co. v. Thullen, 228 Fed. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1916), aff'd on other
grounds, 235 Fed. 74 (3d Cir. 1916).
31. E.g., Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); Howard v. Howe,
61 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 731 (1933).
[VOL. 11
13
Siekman: Transfers in Contemplation of Death - The Golden Anniversary of C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
SUMMER 1966]
in future patented inventions. 32 The exception applies where the employee
is hired to invent, either in a general or specific area.
From such an employment relation, based on either a formal or an im-
plied contract, the law implies an agreement by the employee to assign
to his employer any future patent rights in inventions related to his employ-
ment and discovered during the term of employment.33 This employment
relationship may exist where the employee's entire job consists of inventing
or where he is to solve only a particular problem requiring an inventive
solution. 34 The employee in either case reasonably understands "that such
inventions as resulted from his performance of the contract should belong to
the employer, [and that] the employee is under an implied obligation to
assign any patents acquired by him for said inventions to his employer."35
Since there is an implied contract for the term of the employment, the
employer need not have a prior specific agreement to assign any inventions, 3 6
and he can compel an assignment in equity.3 7 In Standard Parts Co. v.
Peck,35 the leading case in the area, an employee was held not to have an
interest in an automobile front spring that he had been hired to invent.3 9
A situation requiring a difficult application of this theory exists where
the employee is not hired to invent, but discovers an invention as a direct
result of his employment. It has generally been held that such circumstances
do not give rise to an implied contract to invent. In United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp.,40 the Supreme Court held that two government
employees were under no obligation to assign patents on a radio device
perfected by them, even though their invention was only an extension of
their work in the development of remote control bombs and torpedoes.
Another circumstance which creates difficulty in the interpretation of this
32. Perhaps one may conceive of another exception applicable to the narrow
situation where the employee holds a peculiar position of trust in the company. Such
would be the case where the employee pirates and patents an invention in his own
name, after having been entrusted to manage the total operation of a company manu-
facturing the invention. See Transparent Ruler Co. v. C-Thru Ruler Co., 129 Conn.
369, 28 A.2d 232 (1942). .See also Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 Fed. 308 (N.D.
Ill. 1918).
33. The invention may be achieved on or off the job, but it must be in the em-
ployers line of business.
34. E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1927)(general contract to invent) ; Lion Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 106 F.2d
930 (7th Cir. 1939) (having to develop a specific device). See 4 WALKER PATENTS§§ 375-76 (Deller 2d ed. 1964).
35. National Development Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1944).
36. Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277
U.S. 592 (1928).
37. Tennessee Copper & Chem. Corp. v. Martin, 4 F. Supp. 38 (D.N.J. 1932),
aff'd, 66 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1933).
38. 264 U.S. 52 (1924). See 36 HARV. L. REv. 468 (1923). Another important
Supreme Court case with this view is United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178 (1933).
39. E.g., Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass.
158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921); Air Reduction Co. v. Walker, 118 Misc. 827, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 120 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
40. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
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rule occurs where the employee is hired for his expertise in a certain field
to aid in the development of the company's product. Here again, the law
does not imply a contract of assignment. 41
Court application of this doctrine places the burden of proof on the em-
ployer to show that there was in fact a hiring to invent,42 and there must be a
very strong showing of favorable circumstances to imply such a contract.4 3
IV. THE EMPLOYEE INVENTS USING THE EMPLOYER'S
RESOURCES - THE SHoP-RIGHT DOCTRINE
Just as an employer may obtain an implied assignment of future patents
by hiring an employee to invent, he may also obtain an implied license to
use the employee's invention if the employee has utilized the employer's
resources in the discovery.44 This doctrine is based upon two theories.
First, when an invention is discovered through the use of an employer's
facilities, the employer as a matter of justice is entitled to free use of the
invention.45 The second theory finds an implied contract to grant a license
to the employer, the consideration given by the employer being the use of his
resources. However, since this latter basis is contractual, the employee-
inventor must also assent to the employer's use.4 6 It should be noted that in
either case this shop-right of the employer is a mere license and not an
assignment granting full title.47 Neither is shop-right license an exclusive
one ;48 others may be licensed by the patentee-employee. However, the
41. American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 84 N.E. 133 (1908) ;
Gemco Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 82 Ohio App. 324, 77 N.E.2d 742 (1947).
42. Heywood-Wakefield Co. v. Small, 87 F.2d 716 (1st Cir. 1937) ; State Bd. of
Education v. Bourne, 150 Fla. 323, 7 So. 2d 838 (1942). Another courtroom rule, this
one of evidence, is whether prior express assignments of the employee's invention
justify the conclusion that he was hired to invent. It has been stated that this is con-
clusive evidence. Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F.2d 739
(7th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 740 (1927). But the better view would limit
the evidentiary force of this fact short of allowing it to be conclusive. See Bowers v.
Woodman, 59 F.2d 727 (D. Mass. 1932) ; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 Fed.
403 (3d Cir. 1905), cert. denied, 199 U.S. 608 (1905).
43. Howard v. Howe, 61 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1932) ; Gear Grinding Mach. Co. v.
Stuber, 282 Mich. 455, 276 N.W. 514 (1937).
44. This situation, where the employee actually achieves a patentable invention
by discovering the scientific principle, should be distinguished from another possible
situation where the employer uses only mechanical skill in giving form to his em-
ployer's principle. In such a case the employer, not the employee, is the inventor and
has title, not a license. See Agawan Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 563 (1898)
Pembroke v. Sulzer, 265 Fed. 996 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
45. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
46. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 187 (1843). As in McClurg, some
cases allow this assent to be implied from circumstances, e.g., the allowing of the
employer to utilize the invention. Other cases have required an expressed assent.
Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
47. Whether an officer of a corporation may be considered an employee within
the shop-right doctrine is subject to some disagreement. See American Stoker Co. v.
Underfeed Stoker Co. of America, 182 Fed. 642 (W.D. Pa. 1910) ; contra, Dalzell v.
Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 319 (1893) ; Detroit Testing Laboratory v.
Robinson, 221 Mich. 442, 191 N.W. 218 (1922).
48. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
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license is presumed to be gratis 49 and it is up to the employee to show that
the employer agreed to pay a royalty. 50
The shop-right doctrine is a doctrine of the common law initiated as
far back as 1843 in McClurg v. Kingsland.51 In that case, suit was brought
by assignees of the employee-patentees against the employer for infringe-
ment. The verdict was for the defendant on the ground that he possessed
a license to use the invention (an improved method of casting metallic
cylinders and cones) since it had been developed by using the employer's
physical facilities and on the employer's time.52
But while the shop-right theory may be easily and concisely stated as
implying the grant of a license from an employee's use of his employer's
facilities, the finding of a use sufficient to warrant the application of the
rule in a particular situation involves a complex factual determination. The
use of company time and materials has been deemed sufficient. 53 Utilization
of the employer's tools, any labor assistance from fellow employees and
company funds are other resources of the employer. In each case, the court
must make a decision as to the equity of implying a license in the par-
ticular circumstances. 54
The employer's claim under the shop-right theory is limited to inven-
tions applicable to his business 55 and it is coextensive only with his business
requirements.56 The shop-right is also limited in extent of time. In With-
ington-Cooley Mfg. Co. v. Kinney,57 the court divided inventions into three
categories: processes, machines for making articles or products for sale, and
articles or products made for use or sale. Processes provide shop-rights for
the life of the patent as do any inventions or articles made for use or sale.
However, the invention of a machine permits a shop-right only to the use
oi that specific machine.
49. Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896) ; Barry v. Crane Brothers Mfg.Co., 22 Fed. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1884) ; contra, Deane v. Hodge, 35 Minn. 146, 27 N.W. 917(1886) (but this case is against the overwhelming weight of authority).
50. Wilson v. American Circular Loom Co., 187 Fed. 840 (1st Cir. 1911).
51. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 187 (1843). The Court also based its decision on the fact
that the employer had been allowed by the employees to utilize the invention and thus
the employees had abandoned their exclusive patent rights.
52. For the shop-right doctrine in general, see ELLIS, PATENT LICENSEs §§ 67-73
(Deller's ed. 1958).
53. Pure Oil Co. v. Hyman, 95 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1938). The use of company
time, material and labor assistance was deemed sufficient in Scott v. Madison Woolen
Co., 3 F.2d 331 (S.D. Me. 1925).
54. "This is an application of equitable principles. Since the servant uses his
masters time, facilities and materials to attain a concrete result, the latter is in equity
entitled to use that which embodies his own property and to duplicate it as often as
he may find occasion to employ similar appliances in his business." United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1933).
55. Small v. Heywood-Wakefield Co., 13 F. Supp. 825 (D. Mass. 1936).
56. Pure Oil v. Hyman, 95 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1938). And where the patent
obtained by the employee has other applications besides those in the employer's business,
the shop-right only extends to the use in the employers business line. Crites v. Radtke,
28 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
57. 68 Fed. 500 (6th Cir. 1895).
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Another limitation on the shop-right is its non-assignability. The
license implied under the theory is a personal right of the employer's firm,
and only the business-employer or his corporate successor may legitimately
use the invention." This prohibition on third-party assignment is consistent
with the limiting of shop-right subject matter to the employer's business.
V. CONCLUSION
By focusing on the contract between the employee and his employer,
and characterizing this relation into three main divisions, a body of law
may be obtained capable of analyzing the many cases dealing with the con-
flicting patent claims of employers and employees.
An express contract between the parties will govern and require assign-
ment by the employee. However, in the absence of an agreement regulat-
ing their conflicting interests, the employee and his employer must resort to
case law to ascertain their patent rights. An employment contract to invent,
either generally or as related to a particular problem, implies an agreement
to assign resulting patent claims to the employer. A general employment
contract has no such result, yet if the employee uses the resources of his
employer, the shop-right doctrine implies a license in the employer. Absent
the application of any of the above rules, the employee retains full and
absolute title to the patent.5 9
Thomas C. Siekman
58. E.g., General Point Corp. v. Kromer, 68 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
292 U.S. 623 (1934).
59. See ReSTATHMENT (SVCOND), AGENCY § 397 (1958). However, where an
employer has adequately overcome his burden of establishing an interest in the em-
ployee's invention, the employee may still avail himself of two defenses - release or
estoppel. The defense of a release, in this area as in any other, settles the controversy
between the parties. So a release by which the employer relinquishes all rights and
claims he has in the patent is a valid defense. See Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157
N.E.2d 505, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1959). Estoppel obviously is also a doctrine not
confined to the patent field. If the employer previously insisted that the invention was
not made during the employment [Texas Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 26 F.2d 394 (5th
Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 625 (1928)], or where he rejects the invention[Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Allen, 231 Mich. 69, 203 N.W. 890 (1925)], he is later
estopped from claiming whatever rights he may have had.
[VOL. 1 1
17
Siekman: Transfers in Contemplation of Death - The Golden Anniversary of C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
